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Abstract
Background: Internet is becoming an increasingly common tool for survey research, particularly among “hidden” or vulnerable
populations, such as men who have sex with men (MSM). Web-based research has many advantages for participants and researchers,
but fraud can present a significant threat to data integrity.
Objective: The purpose of this analysis was to evaluate fraud detection strategies in a Web-based survey of young MSM and
describe new protocols to improve fraud detection in Web-based survey research.
Methods: This study involved a cross-sectional Web-based survey that examined individual- and network-level risk factors for
HIV transmission and substance use among young MSM residing in 15 counties in Central Kentucky. Each survey entry, which
was at least 50% complete, was evaluated by the study staff for fraud using an algorithm involving 8 criteria based on a combination
of geolocation data, survey data, and personal information. Entries were classified as fraudulent, potentially fraudulent, or valid.
Descriptive analyses were performed to describe each fraud detection criterion among entries.
Results: Of the 414 survey entries, the final categorization resulted in 119 (28.7%) entries identified as fraud, 42 (10.1%) as
potential fraud, and 253 (61.1%) as valid. Geolocation outside of the study area (164/414, 39.6%) was the most frequently violated
criterion. However, 33.3% (82/246) of the entries that had ineligible geolocations belonged to participants who were in eligible
locations (as verified by their request to mail payment to an address within the study area or participation at a local event). The
second most frequently violated criterion was an invalid phone number (94/414, 22.7%), followed by mismatching names within
an entry (43/414, 10.4%) and unusual email addresses (37/414, 8.9%). Less than 5% (18/414) of the entries had some combination
of personal information items matching that of a previous entry.
Conclusions: This study suggests that researchers conducting Web-based surveys of MSM should be vigilant about the potential
for fraud. Researchers should have a fraud detection algorithm in place prior to data collection and should not rely on the Internet
Protocol (IP) address or geolocation alone, but should rather use a combination of indicators.
(JMIR Public Health Surveill 2019;5(1):e12344)  doi: 10.2196/12344
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Introduction
The internet is becoming an increasingly common tool for
survey research [1-8]. Online instruments present opportunities
to recruit “hidden” or vulnerable populations that have
previously been difficult to reach, including men who have sex
with men (MSM), people who use drugs, and transgender people
[2,9-13]. Internet-based research allows for anonymity and
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decreases barriers for participants. The confidentiality and
distance from the researcher provided with Web-based data
collection creates a space for participants, especially those who
are part of a stigmatized population, to provide information
honestly and with less apprehension [2,4,9,14,15]. Furthermore,
Web-based methods may be more appropriate and effective in
reaching communities that are highly active on the Web, such
as MSM who use social and sexual networking websites and
dating and sexual mobile phone apps [2]. Internet as a data
collection tool also allows researchers to reach geographically
dispersed populations [4,9] and minimizes cost to researchers,
providing an effective, cost-efficient method to recruit and
collect data from hard-to-reach populations [2,3,7,8,14-16].
However, the anonymity of internet-based research that serves
as an advantage for data collection also poses challenges that
portend data quality and validity. Surveying participants in
person allows investigators to better enforce inclusion criteria
and prevent duplicate enrollment [2,3,7,9,14,15,17], while the
process of avoiding fraudulent enrollment in Web-based research
is more difficult. Previous research has focused on 2 different
types of invalid entries as follows: (1) ineligible participants
who misrepresent themselves to fit eligibility criteria to profit
from compensation (ie, misrepresentation fraud) and (2) eligible
participants who participate more than once without malefic
intent or to receive additional compensation (ie, duplicate fraud)
[2,4,7,9,13-19]. The confidentiality and anonymity of
Web-based research make it difficult to prevent such entries,
posing a threat to data integrity if appropriate data quality
protocols are not in place [4,7,13-15,17-20]. Bots and smart
software that have the capability to produce human-like data
with unique Internet Protocol (IP) addresses can also lead to
invalid or fraudulent data [21]. Computer program (ie, bots)
and human fraud must both, therefore, be considered in fraud
identification strategies. As others have noted [1,2], increasing
use of Web-based methodology warrants the development of
standards and expectations for Web-based research to ensure
data validity and accurate result reporting.
Previous research has focused on the use of a handful of
characteristics that can be used to identify fraud (eg, IP address;
personal information such as name, address, and email address;
response patterns; and timestamps) [2,3,7,9,13-15,17,18,20,22].
However, technology is rapidly advancing, as is the savviness
of its users, and approaches previously used to prevent and
detect fraud may now lack utility or need to be supplemented
with other techniques [2]. For example, the development and
increasing use of network devices and smartphones have made
it more difficult to utilize IP addresses as they can be masked
both intentionally and unintentionally by users [23-26]. The
purpose of this analysis was to evaluate fraud detection strategies
in a Web-based survey of young MSM and describe new
protocols to improve fraud detection in Web-based survey
research.
Methods
Study Design
The Men’s Health Study was a cross-sectional survey that
examined individual- and network-level risk factors for HIV
transmission and substance use among young MSM residing in
15 counties in Central Kentucky (total population size, 743,119)
[27]. The eligibility criteria included being aged 18-34 years,
being biologically male, having engaged in anal sex with another
man during the past 6 months, and residing in Central Kentucky.
Qualtrics [28], a Web-based survey service, was used to create
a Web-based eligibility screening assessment, consent form,
and behavioral and demographic survey. A link to the Qualtrics
survey was posted on the study website hosted by WordPress
[29], which also described the monetary incentive, the process
for completing the screening assessment, consent form, and
survey, and provided community resources and contact
information for the research staff. Based on pilot-testing among
the staff, the screening, consent, and survey were anticipated
to require a maximum of 45 minutes to complete, and the survey
was anticipated to take between 5 and 30 minutes to complete
depending on responses and subsequent skip patterns.
Participants were recruited from February to July 2018 utilizing
flyers containing the Web address and a quick response code
for the study’s website. The flyers were posted in local lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) venues (eg,
bars, adult entertainment stores, and health clinics) and on social
media via a study-specific page and young adult LGBTQ groups.
Staff also set up booths at 2 local LGBTQ events to disseminate
flyers; at one event, the booth allowed space for participants to
take the survey and be reimbursed on site. Recruitment also
involved peer referral. During the survey and informed consent
form, participants were informed that they were allowed to refer
up to 3 peers to the study and receive US $10 per eligible referral
who completed the survey. Upon completion of the survey,
participants received a message from the staff that contained
the survey URL and a referral code number and reminded them
that they could earn up to US $30 for peer referrals; the former
allowed the staff to link participants to people they refer.
Participants could choose to receive this message from the staff
via a short message service (SMS) text message or email, and
provided their phone number or email address accordingly.
Participants who completed the survey had the option of
declining an incentive or receiving a US $25 e-gift card or
mailed payment and provided details either on their email
address or mailing address. Participants were informed that the
same method of delivery chosen for their US $25 survey
incentive would be used for their peer referral incentives. Those
who were recruited at local LGBTQ events were also given the
option to receive their US $25 incentive in-person as payment
and, then, were asked if they would like to receive their peer
referral incentives as an e-gift card or mailed payment. All
procedures were approved by the University of Kentucky’s
Institutional Review Board.
Fraud Prevention Strategies
Prior to launching the Web-based survey, 4 strategies were
implemented to prevent fraud. First, the informed consent form
stated that participants should not take the survey more than
once, and if this occurred, incentives would not be received
more than once. Second, participants could not enter their email
or mailing address to receive compensation until the very end
of the survey, making the process to receive incentives more
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time-consuming in an effort to deter fraud. Third, to prevent
participants from taking the survey more than once, either as a
duplicate entry or to try to determine the eligibility criteria and
subsequently misrepresent themselves to meet those criteria,
the “prevent ballot box stuffing” option in Qualtrics was
activated. This option places a cookie on the browser when a
response is submitted so that if the survey link is clicked on
again from the same device and browser, Qualtrics would detect
the cookie and prevent the person from entering the survey [30].
Fourth, an option was also activated in Qualtrics to prevent
indexing, which blocks search engines from finding the survey
and presenting it in search results [30], thereby reducing the
likelihood of fraudulent or inapposite participation. Of note,
validation using GeoIP location, an estimate of a person’s
location based on the IP address, was not used to block survey
access because GeoIP location is not always accurate.
Smartphones, remote access tools (eg, virtual private network),
and network address translators (NATs) used by organizations
or companies that assign public addresses to a computer inside
a private network for security purposes can result in less accurate
or concealed GeoIP estimates [23-26]. In addition, the survey
did not use a tool like a Completely Automated Public Turing
Test to tell Computers and Humans Apart, which could have
reduced fraud by requiring respondents to verify that they were
not robots [30]. However, previous research has demonstrated
that Completely Automated Public Turing Test to tell Computers
and Humans Apart tool verification is not failproof and can be
passed despite an entry being invalid or fraud [21].
Fraud Criteria and Detection Strategies
Each survey that was at least 50% complete was manually
checked by the study staff utilizing an extensive protocol (Figure
1) to detect fraud based on 8 criteria (described below). A point
system was used with each criterion having an assigned point
value of 1 or 2, and the total was used to classify surveys as
fraudulent, potentially fraudulent, or valid. Data characteristics
that were considered to possibly indicate fraud but could also
have a reasonable justification were assigned 1 point so that
they could be flagged as suspicious and confirmed through
correspondence with participants. Data characteristics that were
considered to be strongly and independently indicative of fraud
were assigned 2 points. A 2-point threshold was, therefore, used
for classification as fraud. The measures listed below were used
in the fraud detection algorithm.
Geolocation
The survey software logged approximate latitude and longitude
locations for participants by comparing IP addresses to a location
database [23,24,30]. These data are typically accurate to the
city level within the United States. Outside of the United States,
data are only accurate at the country level [30].
Geolocation outside of the study area was valuable for assisting
with fraud detection but could not be used as a stand-alone fraud
detection mechanism because only an external IP address is
displayed when a device is connected to a virtual private
network or NAT. This causes all devices to have identical IP
addresses and geolocation [24,26]. Additionally, research staff
found that surveys they knew to be local and valid (ie, those
completed at local LGBTQ events) would frequently have
geolocations outside of the study area, sometimes even outside
of the state of Kentucky. Surveys at LGBTQ events were
completed on smartphones, which can display different IP
addresses within minutes because of network proxies within
the carrier’s network. This results in inaccurate geolocation
based on IP addresses [25].
Geolocation based on IP addresses was, therefore, not used in
isolation as a fraud detection mechanism but was considered in
the context of other indicators of location. In-person recruitment
events and mailing address for those who requested payment
incentives allowed the study staff to verify the location of
participants. If the survey was completed at an in-person event
or if the incentive was requested to be mailed to an address in
the study area, the IP address geolocation outside of the study
area was not used as an indicator of fraud. However, if the IP
address geolocation was outside of the study area, the incentive
requested was an e-gift card, and the survey was not completed
in-person at a recruitment event, then the survey received 1
point toward the fraud detection point total.
Phone Number
Participants were asked to provide telephone numbers if they
consented to be contacted for future research and as a method
to receive a referral code. The staff searched phone numbers on
the Web using Whitepages.org to identify instances in which
the numbers were invalid or corresponded with local businesses
or organizations, in which case, the survey received 1 point
[15]. Phone numbers were kept separate from all survey data
to ensure participants’ privacy and anonymity.
Names
When the survey was initially launched, participants were asked
to give their name only if they consented to be contacted for
future research or they requested payment through the mail for
their incentive. To be able to investigate fraudulent behavior
among e-gift card recipients, researchers began requesting
participants name when e-gift cards were selected as an
incentive. In addition, names were sometimes contained in or
associated with email addresses (eg, john.doe@email.com)
entered to receive e-gift card incentive, referral code, or
community resources. Therefore, names were given up to 3
times—for incentive delivery, through names linked to or
contained in email addresses, and in the consent to future
research section. This allowed researchers to cross-reference
names up to 3 times. If names did not match within a survey,
participants were assigned 1 point toward fraud.
Email Address
Email addresses were examined to detect potential fraud. As
done in a previous study [21], addresses with alternating letters
and numbers (eg, a12bcd34e@email.com) were suspected by
researchers to be fake email accounts (ie, created by a Bot
program or by a human trying to misrepresent themselves).
Surveys associated with such email addresses received 1 point
toward fraud.
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Figure 1. Web-based survey fraud detection algorithm.
Personal Information
Personal information, including name, phone number, date of
birth, email address, and mailing address, was compared across
surveys to detect fraud. If 2 personal information items (ie,
phone number, email address, and mailing address) matched a
previously completed survey, the survey received 1 point toward
their fraud total. Those with matching information but different
names and date of birth could represent phone sharing and
cohabitation, so surveys that contained contact information that
had been entered previously but different names and dates of
birth were contacted by the study staff to verify their identity
as a unique participant (further described in Fraud
Categorization below). Those with 1 or more matching personal
information items and the same first and last name as a previous
survey received 2 points as this was seen as a definite sign fraud.
Additionally, surveys with, at least, one matching personal
information item and the same date of birth as a previous survey
received 2 points.
Survey Duration
Qualtrics collected timestamps for the screening, consent form,
and survey sections. For each section, Qualtrics recorded the
time each section began and ended. Of note, there was no option
to save survey progress, preventing completion across multiple
sessions. If the survey was completed in <5 minutes, the entry
received 1 point.
Fraud Categorization
Figure 2 displays data on survey entries and fraud categorization.
Surveys were classified as fraudulent if the total entry point
value added to ≥2. Depending on what contact information was
provided, fraudulent surveys received a phone call, SMS text
message, or email stating, “You recently completed a survey
for a health study online. However, we detected that your survey
entry was fraudulent. If you think this is a mistake, please
contact us”, with the intent of deterring further fraudulent
behavior. If participants did not respond, their survey was
considered invalid and they did not receive compensation. No
responses were received from those categorized as fraudulent.
Surveys were classified as potential fraud if the total point value
added to 1. Potentially fraudulent participants received a phone
call, SMS text message, or an email stating, “Thank you for
completing the UK Health Study online survey. We have been
experiencing fraud in the study and your survey entry has been
flagged as suspicious. We sincerely apologize for the
inconvenience if this was an error. Please contact us by calling
xxx-xxx-xxxx to confirm that you did indeed complete a survey
and we will send your $25 incentive.” This message was meant
to deter those who were indeed fraudulent but also provide an
opportunity for valid submissions to verify legitimacy. They
were asked to confirm personal information such as date of
birth, mailing address, or email address to validate their survey.
If a participant responded and was unable to provide verification,
the survey was categorized as fraudulent. If a participant did
not respond, the survey remained as potentially fraudulent.
Surveys were classified as valid if they met none of the fraud
detection criteria or if they were originally classified as
potentially fraudulent but contacted study staff to confirm the
validity of their survey entry.
Analyses
Descriptive analyses were performed using SAS software,
version 9.4 (SAS Institute; Cary, NC, USA) to describe the
number and percentage who violated each fraud detection
criterion among those that were classified as fraud, potential
fraud, and valid.
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Figure 2. Flowchart of survey entries and fraud categorization.
Results
Overall, 62.3% (490/787) of the completed screening
questionnaires were eligible. Of 490 who were eligible, 437
(89.2%) completed the consent and 408 (51.2%) completed the
survey with an average survey duration of 19 minutes and 41
seconds. In addition, there were 26 partial surveys, of which 18
were missing several measures used for fraud detection and a
majority of survey responses and, therefore, were not included
in analyses presented below or in the final set of valid responses.
Six partial surveys were >50% complete and were included in
analyses, making 414 the final number of surveys in need of
evaluation for fraud.
Of 414 surveys, 117 (28.3%) were initially categorized as fraud,
72 (17.4%) were categorized as potential fraud, and 225 (54.3%)
were considered valid. Of 72 surveys originally classified as
potential fraud, 2 participants responded and admitted to living
outside of the study area, 42 did not respond, and 28 were able
to verify their survey and were reclassified as valid (see Figure
2). Therefore, of the 414 surveys, the final categorization
resulted in 119 (28.7%) surveys identified as fraud, 42 (10.1%)
as potential fraud, and 253 (61.1%) as valid for the final sample
and analyses (see Table 1). Of the 164 who had geolocation
outside of the study area and were not mailed payment or
recruited at a local event, 23 (14.0%) had locations outside of
the United States, 118 (72.0%) in states other than Kentucky,
and 23 (14.0%) within Kentucky but outside of the 15-county
study area (Table 1).
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Table 1. The number of surveys that violated the fraud detection measure by category.
Valid (n=253)a,
n (%)
Potential fraud, (n=42)a,
n (%)
Fraud, (n=119)a,
n (%)
Missing,
n (%)
Total (n=414),
n (%)
Fraud detection measure
21 (8)34 (81)109 (91.6)0 (0.0)164 (39.6)Geolocation outside of study area based on IPb address
and unable to be confirmed through mailing address
or participating at a local event
0 (0.0)0 (0.0)94 (79.0)93 (22.5)c94 (22.7)Phone number was a local business or organization
phone number
4 (1.6)2 (4.8)37 (31.1)71 (17.1)c43 (10.4)Mismatching names within entry
2 (0.8)1 (2.4)34 (28.6)98 (23.7)c37 (8.9)Unusual email address
0 (0.0)0 (0.0)13 (10.9)16 (3.9)c13 (3.1)First and last name AND one or more other personal
items match other previous entry
0 (0.0)3 (7.1)3 (2.5)67 (16.2)c6 (1.4)Two or more personal items match other previous entry
0 (0.0)0 (0.0)5 (4.2)5 (1.2)c5 (1.2)Date of birth AND one or more other personal items
match other previous entry
1 (0.4)2 (4.8)0 (0.0)0 (0.0)3 (0.7)Survey duration <5 minutes
aSample size represents final categorizations (ie, reclassification of some that were initially classified as potential fraud as valid or fraudulent based on
the verification with participants).
bIP: interenet protocol.
cParticipants were not required to give personal information (ie, phone number, name, email address) if they did not want to be contacted about future
research opportunities, declined their incentive, or if they did not complete the section of the survey describing the referral process. If a personal item
was missing needed for a measure, the variable was considered missing.
Figure 1 lists each of the 8 fraud detection criterion used with
the assigned point value and the number of surveys that fit that
criterion. Surveys had the potential to violate 8 criteria that
created a point scale from 0 to 10 points. The actually observed
score range was 0-5 points. Data showed that 59.4% (246/414)
of all entries had geolocation outside of the study area. However,
33.3% (82/246) of the surveys that had ineligible geolocations
belonged to participants who were in eligible locations (as
verified by their request to mail payment to an address within
the study area or participation at a local event). The second most
frequently violated criterion was an invalid phone number
(94/414, 22.7%), followed by mismatching names within a
survey (43/414, 10.4%) and unusual email addresses (37/414,
8.9%). Less than 5% (18/414) had some combination of personal
information items matching that of a previous survey (ie, criteria
e, f, and g in Table 1). Of the 414 surveys, 3 were below the
minimum time threshold established by the study staff,
completing it in <5 minutes.
Of note, many surveys violated more than one criterion. Of the
164 entries that violated the geolocation criterion, 94 (57.3%)
also had invalid phone numbers, 35 (21.3%) had mismatching
names within the survey, and 34 (20.7%) had unusual email
addresses. Of the 94 surveys with invalid phone numbers, 29
(30.9%) had mismatching names within the survey and 28
(29.7%) had unusual email addresses. In total, 42.3% (175/414)
of surveys violated some combination of the geolocation, phone
number, mismatching names, or the email address criteria. The
detection measure of matching name and personal identifier
data were not independently useful in detecting fraud. A total
of 10.9% (13/119) surveys had first and last names and, at least,
one other personal items that matched that of previous entries,
but all of these also violated some other fraud criteria. Similarly,
all surveys that had a date of birth (5/119) that matched a
previous survey’s date of birth also violated some other fraud
criteria.
Of 119 surveys classified as fraudulent, 109 (91.6%) had
geolocations outside the study area, 94 (79.0%) provided
business or organization phone numbers rather than personal
phone numbers, 37 (31.1%) provided mismatching names within
the surveys, and 34 (28.6%) had unusual email addresses. In
total, 93.3% (111/119) of fraudulent surveys violated at least
one of the following criteria: geolocation, phone number,
mismatching names, or the email address; 86.6% (103/119)
violated at least 2 of those 4 criteria.
IP addresses were not used in the fraud detection algorithm
because analyses demonstrated that they would have limited
utility. Overall, 23.0% (95/414) of the surveys had an IP address
identically matching that of at least one other survey entry;
however, 13.7% (13/95) of those with matching IP addresses
were surveys completed at in-person local events and were
observed by the staff as being unique individuals. Of the
remaining 82 surveys, 47 (57.3%) were classified as valid
surveys, 12 (14.6%) were potential fraud, and 23 (28.1%) were
fraudulent.
Discussion
Principal Findings
In this Web-based study of young MSM, a robust fraud detection
algorithm involving geolocation, phone number, email address,
name, and other personal data revealed that 28.7% (119/414)
of all eligible survey entries were fraudulent. The majority of
fraudulent surveys involved participants whose IP address had
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geolocation outside of the study area, invalid phone numbers
(ie, local business phone numbers), mismatching names within
the survey, and unusual email addresses (ie,
a12bcd34e@email.com). These findings are consistent with
prior studies’ conclusions that fraud can be pervasive in
Web-based research [5,7,9,13-22], but extends previous studies
by outlining a step-by-step fraud detection strategy that does
not rely on IP address and geolocation, which were identified
in this study to have substantial limitations.
Previous studies have used IP address to detect duplicate entries
[2,9,13-15,17,19] but this was not used in this study because
(1) Qualtrics’ ballot box stuffing prevention feature was used
to prevent multiple entries from the same IP addresses and (2)
matching IP addresses may not necessarily indicate fraud but
occur in instances where >1 eligible participant lives in the same
household, shares devices, or is accessing the survey from a
communal space (eg, library or other venues with public Wi-Fi
access). Furthermore, IP address to identify duplicate entries
was not found to be appropriate based on the increasing use of
smartphones, remote access tools, and NATs [23-26]. Remote
access tools and NATs present the same IP address across users
[26] and present challenges to researchers in differentiating
between users. On the other hand, smartphones can present
different IP addresses within minutes based on the mobile tower
the signal is being routed through [26]; this allows individuals
to intentionally or unintentionally obscure their IP address and
geolocation, therein limiting the usefulness of the measure. In
addition, the increasing threat of bots and smart software that
produce human-like data with unique IP addresses further limit
this measure as a tool to detect fraud [21]. In this study, the
majority of repeat IP addresses were valid entries, suggesting
that IP address should be used with caution as a measure for
fraud detection.
Geolocation linked to IP address to assist in assessing
geographic eligibility (ie, residence in the 15-county study area)
was used, but in combination with other indicators of fraud
because of the inaccuracy of geolocation data that can be
introduced by smartphones, remote access tools, NATs, bots,
and smart software [21,23-26]. One out of 3 surveys that had
ineligible geolocations based on the IP address belonged to
participants who were in eligible locations, as verified by their
request to mail payment to an address within the study area or
by the staff observing their participation at a local event. Thus,
like IP address, geolocation used for fraud detection should not
be used in isolation.
Other measures that were found to be useful in fraud detection
were invalid phone numbers, mismatching names within a
survey, and unusual email addresses. Invalid phone numbers
included a variety of local businesses and organizations,
including manufacturing companies, health care organizations,
professional associations, and university offices. Surprisingly,
names at different parts of the survey (ie, consent form, contact
information, and survey incentive information) were entered
inconsistently. Distinct email address patterns that emerged
among fraudulent surveys included addresses that began with
a numeric value, switched between numbers and letters
throughout the address, at least, 3 times, and did not appear to
include initials or a name. Unexpectedly, the detection measure
of matching name and personal identifier data across surveys,
which would indicate duplicate entries, was not useful in
detecting unique cases of fraud; surveys that violated these
criteria also violated other criteria. These findings, however,
may only be representative of this sample and a holistic
approach should be considered for monitoring and detecting
fraud.
Respondents were contacted to verify entries that were
suspicious but not blatantly fraudulent and utilized messages
tailored to fraud category when recontacting respondents.
Similar to previous research among MSM [21], none of the
individuals who received the message tailored to fraudulent
cases responded, possibly indicating that these were, indeed,
fraud. Of those who received the message tailored to potentially
fraudulent cases, 38.9% (28/72) responded with reasonable
explanations such as using a partner’s phone number or email
address or providing a physical address verifying geographic
eligibility and were reclassified as valid. Interestingly, 2 of the
potentially fraudulent cases that were contacted verified their
fraud, explaining that they were indeed outside of the study area
and were confused about geographic eligibility criteria. In
addition, real-time monitoring of fraud was helpful in deterring
subsequent fraud. A majority of fraudulent entries were
submitted within the first month of data collection, but the
frequency dramatically decreased after staff began calling, SMS
text messaging, and emailing targeted messages. Communicating
directly with fraudulent participants may help deter continued
invalid entries from being submitted. Future studies should
consider monitoring fraud in real time and verifying suspicious
surveys with respondents if possible.
Limitations
While the fraud detection algorithm used in the study was robust,
there were limitations. For example, participants’ name and
phone numbers could be left blank and were left blank by 3.9%
(16/414) and 22.5% (93/414) of surveys, respectively. Other
data were available to assist in fraud detection in these cases
(ie, geolocation, email address, physical address, date of birth,
or survey duration); however, those who did not provide name
and phone information had a greater likelihood of not being
detected as fraudulent. In addition, virtual phone systems that
allow for the quick creation of phone numbers may limit the
ability to use phone numbers as a fraud detection algorithm, as
respondents can create local numbers and enter them in the
survey. Furthermore, certain email address providers display
names associated with email addresses when messages are sent
while others do not; those that display names allowed the staff
to better detect name inconsistency within surveys and fraud.
Conclusions
This study suggests that researchers conducting Web-based
surveys of MSM should be vigilant about the potential for fraud.
Researchers should have a fraud detection algorithm in place
prior to data collection to ensure that (1) data needed for fraud
detection are being collected; (2) the informed consent document
can describe that surveys will be evaluated for fraud and what
the consequences are for incentives; and (3) fraud can be
monitored in real time. The latter allows the staff to send
messages to those flagged as fraudulent and potentially
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fraudulent and deter subsequent fraud and avoid
misclassification. Importantly, in research involving populations
engaged in stigmatized or illegal behavior, researchers should
take extra precautions to ensure that messages sent to
respondents do not disclose the focus of the study or eligibility
criteria in case the message is intercepted by an unintended
recipient. In addition, as discussed by Sullivan et al [2],
researchers should be mindful that rapid evolutions in
technology could impact the utility and relevance of previously
published protocols and methodologies. Therefore, continued
innovation in fraud prevention and detection for Web-based
research will be necessary, as will the development of automated
or semiautomated algorithms for detecting and mitigating fraud
[2,5,21]. The latter is especially important given that manual
approaches, such as the one used in this study, can be labor-
and time-intensive and may be difficult to implement in studies
with large samples sizes. Of note, manual approaches may
continue to be important for small Web-based studies on novel
topics [21].
In research involving geographic eligibility criteria (ie, residence
in a certain area), automatic algorithms embedded in Web-based
survey tools that exclude people based on the geolocation should
be used with caution, as geolocations are often inaccurate.
Furthermore, in studies with geographic inclusion criteria, the
entry of a phone number with a local area code should not be
assumed to be a local person, as the entry of local business or
organization numbers can be common. Providing the option of
receiving an incentive through mailed payment rather than only
by e-gift card proved to be a useful tool in fraud detection, not
only for the evaluation of whether the mailing address was
within the study area for those who opted for mailed payments
but also because the staff could deter fraud by contacting
respondents who violated multiple fraud criteria and ask for a
mailing address for the incentive rather than automatically
sending an e-gift card. In addition, the collection of name data
in multiple places throughout the survey, as well as email
address, phone number, mailing address, and geolocation based
on the IP address were, in combination, useful in assisting with
fraud detection.
Future research should consider similar algorithms and should
publish algorithms used for fraud detection to improve
replicability and to benefit the field of online research.
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